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Near Closeness and Conditionals
Daniel Berntson
This paper presents a new system of conditional logicB2, which is strictly intermediate
in strength between the existing systems B1 and B3 from John Burgess (1981) and
David Lewis (1973a). After presenting and motivating the new system, we will show
that it is characterized by a natural class of frames. These frames correspond to the idea
that conditionals are about which worlds are nearly closest, rather than which worlds
are closest. Along the way, we will also give new characterization results for B1 and B3,
along with two other new systems B1.1 and B1.2.
1 Systems
ℒ is the language of propositional logic extendedwith the two-place sentential operator
. We will generally think of this operator as expressing the subjunctive conditional,
so read 𝐴 𝐵 as saying that had it been that 𝐴, it would have been that 𝐵. Most of
what follows, though, applies equally well to the indicative reading.
Besides this first operator, we will also have a second defined operator that is its
dual.
𝐴 𝐵 ≡ ¬(𝐴 ¬𝐵) (1)
Because we are reading as expressing the subjunctive conditional, we will read
𝐴 𝐵 as saying that had it been that 𝐴, it might have been that 𝐵.1
What we are going to call B1 is a Hilbert-style system from John Burgess (1981).2
1. This is notmeant to beg any questions about the duality ofwould andmight counterfactuals. Those
who deny duality can either (a) read 𝐴  𝐵 as saying that it is false that had it been that 𝐴, it would
not have been that 𝐵 or (b) read 𝐴 𝐵 as saying that it is false that had it been that 𝐴, it might not
have been that 𝐵. If duality is denied, I prefer the second option.
2. Note that the rules and axioms given below are in fact slightly different than the ones given by
Burgess.
1
That system extends classical logic3 with two inference rules and several axioms. The
inference rules are:
SUB ⊢ (𝐴 𝐵) ⊃ (𝐴∗  𝐵) when 𝐴 ⊣⊢ 𝐴∗
WEA ⊢ (𝐴 𝐵) ⊃ (𝐴 𝐵∗) when 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐵∗
Thefirst rule is Substitution. This lets us replace the antecedent of a counterfactualwith
anything that is logically equivalent. The second is Weakening, which lets us replace
the consequent of a counterfactual with anything that it logically implies. The axioms
are then:
ID 𝐴 𝐴
IM (𝐴 𝐵 ∧ 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶)
CO (𝐴 𝐵) ∧ (𝐴 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 𝐵 ∧ 𝐶)
DI (𝐴 𝐶) ∧ (𝐵 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶)
The first is Identity, which says that every sentence counterfactually entails itself. The
second is Import, which lets us import a conjunct from the consequent of a counterfac-
tual into the antecedent. The last two axioms are Conjunction andDisjunction, which
have a kind of symmetry. Conjunction lets us conjoin the consequents of counterfactuals
that share an antecedent. Disjunction lets us disjoin the antecedents of counterfactuals
that share a consequent.
We can build other systems by extendingB1with various axioms. Ourmain interest
will be in the following:
DB (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 𝐶) ∨ (𝐵 𝐶)
DM (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ¬𝐴) ∧ (𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐵) ⊃ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐷 ¬𝐴) ∨
(𝐷 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐷)
SM (𝐴 𝐶) ∧ (𝐴 𝐵) ⊃ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶)
CEM (𝐴 𝐵) ∨ (𝐴 ¬𝐵)
ST (𝐴 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶)
We will call the first axiom Distribution. Distribution says that when you have
a counterfactual with a disjunctive antecedent, the counterfactual operator can be
distributed over that disjunction. The second is Diamond, the contents of which
will be explained shortly.4 The third is Strengthen Might, which lets us strengthen
antecedents using might counterfactuals.5 The fourth is the Counterfactual Law of
Excluded Middle, which is a sort of counterfactual analogue of the Law of Excluded
3. See Hartry Field’s (2016) for a non-classical variation of B1.
4. Distribution and Diamond have not, to my knowledge, been discussed elsewhere in the literature.
[BLINDED] reports that [BLINDED] has suggestedDistribution as a plausible principle in conversation.
5. This axiom is also sometimes called Rational Monotonicity.
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Middle. The fifth is Strengthening, which lets us strengthen antecedents using any










These systems are generally numbered in order of strength, with two exceptions. B1.1
and B1.2 are strictly stronger than B1, but neither is strictly stronger than the other.
Similarly, B4 and B5 are both strictly stronger than B1-B3, but neither is strictly
stronger than the other.
Many of these systems have prominent defenders in the literature. Proponents of
the strict conditional analysis, like Kai von Fintel (2001) andTonyGillies (2007), accept
B5, along with Strong Centering andWeak Centering.6
SC (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ⊃ (𝐴 𝐵)
WC (𝐴 𝐵) ⊃ (𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵)
Robert Stalnaker (1970; 1975, 1968, 1980) accepts a system that he callsC2, which is
the result of adding both centering axioms to B4. David Lewis (1973b, 1973a) accepts
a system that he calls VC, which results from adding both centering axioms to B3.7
John Pollock (1975, 1976b, 1976a) rejects Strengthen Might, and so rejects not only
B3, but any system extending it. His preferred system is what he calls SS.8 That system
6. I will sometimes talk about accepting a system of counterfactual logic. For present purposes,
accepting a system means accepting that there is a proof in the system from 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 to 𝐵 iff the
inference from 𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑛 to 𝐵 is correct. Rejecting a system means rejecting the same schematic
biconditional. What it means for an inference to be correct will depend on your substantive views in
the philosophy of logic. You might think, for example, that an inference is correct when it necessarily
preserves truth. Finally, note that given this way of thinking about acceptance and rejection, if you accept
a system, then you are committed to rejecting any system that is either strictly stronger or strictly weaker.
7. Lewis refers to the system that we are calling B3 asV. This system is notable, from his perspective,
because it is sound and complete with respect to the class of all sphere models. B3 is thus the weakest
system that can be modeled using systems of spheres.
8. Kratzer (1981) suggests modeling counterfactuals with what she calls premise semantics. Hermodel
theory is, on the face of it, very different from the modal theory used by Pollock. But as Lewis (1981)
3
is the result of adding both Strong Centering andWeak Centering to B1.
Setting aside centering axioms, then, we can think of the proponents of the strict
conditional analysis as accepting B5, Stalnaker as accepting B4, Lewis as accepting B3,
and Pollock as accepting B1.
My own view is that B2 is the right logic for counterfactuals.9 My reasons for
thinking this are, in broad outline, as follows.
First, like many others, I reject Strengthening for broadly the same reasons as Lewis
(1973a). Suppose that hadMargaux gone to the party, she would have had a good time.
From this, it simply does not follow that had Margaux gone to the party and learned
that an asteroid was about to destroy the earth, she would have had a good time.10 Since
I reject Strengthening, this rules out B5.
Second, like Lewis, I denyCounterfactual ExcludedMiddle.11 It is neither true that
had I flipped a coin one minute ago, it would have landed heads, nor is it true that had
I flipped a coin one minute ago, it would have landed tails. This rules out B4.
Third, I reject Strengthen Might, and so side with Pollock against Lewis, though
I do so for different reasons. Pollock proposes various counterexamples to Strengthen
Might, all of which I find unconvincing.12 Instead, I reject StrengthenMight because
this strikesme as themost natural way to resolve the paradox of counterfactual tolerance.
This paradox was introduced in my (2021) and will be briefly sketched in §2. Since I
reject StrengthenMight, this rules out B3.
points out, the two approaches are in fact equivalent. Every Kratzer model determines a unique Pollock
model, and visa-versa. Thus, Kratzer is also committed to accepting SS.
9. Again, setting aside centering axioms. I am inclined to accept Counterfactual Modus Ponens,
which is equivalent toWeak Centering, given a classical background logic. I am undecided about Strong
Centering, though am somewhat inclined to deny it.
10. von Fintel (2001) and Gillies (2007) argue that such apparent counterexamples can be explained
away using context shifts. But even if they could, I maintain that the paradox of counterfactual tolerance
(to be sketched in §2) gives us a counterexample to Strengthen Might, and so gives us a different style
of counterexample to Strengthening. But counterexamples to Strengthen Might cannot be explained
away using the same sorts of context shifting mechanisms. See Boylan and Schultheis (forthcoming) for
more on this. Perhaps other context shifting mechanisms can do the job but, if so, defenders of the strict
conditional analysis will need to say what they are.
11. This is a bit of simplification. My considered view is that counterfactuals often have both a Lewis
reading and a Stalnaker reading. On the Lewis reading, CEM fails; on the Stalnaker reading, CEM holds.
In the present context, I am interested in the Lewis reading, so reject CEM.
12. See for example pp. 473-474 of Pollock (1976a). Loewer (1979) has a nice discussion of why Pollock-
style counterexamples to StrengthenMight are not convincing. Boylan and Schultheis (forthcoming) have
recently suggested another, much cleaner, Pollock-style counterexample. I ultimately reject Pollock-style
counterexamples to StrengthenMight because I canfindnouniform reading that generates all the necessary
judgments. This, I suspect, is because such counterfactuals run afoul of another principle I like called
Strengthen Easy. For discussion of that principle, see my (2021).
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Fourth, while I sidewith Pollock on the question of StrengthenMight, we part ways
when it comes to Distribution. Frommy perspective, Distribution is obviously correct.
For example, suppose that:
Had it either rained or snowed, Naomi would have been pleased. (2)
From this it would seem to follow that the disjunction of the following two claims is
true:
Had it rained, Naomi would have been pleased. (3)
Had it snowed, Naomi would have been pleased. (4)
The problem for Pollock is that he accepts B1 and so is committed to rejecting
Distribution.13 As a result, he is committed to the view that the truth of (2) is entirely
consistent with the falsity of both (3) and (4). This strikes me as absurd, so I reject
B1.14,15
It may be worth pointing out that Distribution has a certain passing resemblance
to a controversial principle called the Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents (or
Simplification for short).
SDA (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 𝐶) ∧ (𝐵 𝐶)
Simplification is the converse of Disjunction. The difference between Simplification
and Distribution is that where Simplification has a conjunction in the consequent,
Distribution only has a disjunction. This makes all the difference in the world. Suppose
for example that (2) is true. In that case, Simplification tells us that both (3) and (4) are
true. Distribution, on the other hand, only says that at least one of them is true. As
further illustration of the difference, we might also note that while Distribution is a
theorem of Lewis’s B3, Simplification is not.
This leaves us to decide between B1.1 and B2. The difference between the two is
that B2 validates Diamond, but B1.1 does not. So what does Diamond say? Suppose
that Alice had been given the choice between one dollar, two dollars, three dollars, and
one beer. Plausibly:
Had Alice chosen either one dollar or two dollars, she would not
have chosen one dollar.
(5)
13. This follows from Theorem 6.21. For a countermodel, see Proposition 7.14.
14. For further discussion and motivation of Distribution, see my (2021).
15. Given our observation in Footnote 8, premise semantics invalidates Distribution, and so Kratzer is
also committed to rejecting Distribution.
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Had Alice chosen either two dollars or three dollars, she would not
have chosen two dollars.
(6)
Diamond then tells us that the disjunction of the following two claims is true:
Had Alice chosen either one dollar or one beer, she would not have
chosen one dollar.
(7)
Had Alice chosen either one beer or three dollars, she would not
have chosen one beer.
(8)
The reasoning here is complex and I grant that the correctness of Diamond is not
completely obvious. Nevertheless, I think that the axiom is in fact correct.16 Should it
turn out to fail, I would be reasonably happy retreating from B2 to B1.1.
From a theoretical perspective, there are two reason to like Diamond. The first is
that while StrengthenMight may not be correct, it is still compelling. We would thus
like to preserve as much of the content as we can without generating paradox. DM is
strictly weaker than SM and does not generate paradox. So this gives us some reason to
accept DM.
The second reason has to do with models. There is a common thought that the
truth of counterfactuals can be modeled by saying which possible worlds are closest. In
fact, I think this common view is mistaken. We will say more about this in §4, but my
view is that counterfactual should instead bemodeled by sayingwhichworlds arenearly
closest. But in that case, it is natural to think that our models will validate Diamond.
Thus, the fact that B2 has an especially natural model theory is some reason to think
that Diamond is correct.
Here is the plan for the rest of this paper. In §2, we will sketch the paradox of
counterfactual tolerance as a way of motivating our interest in systems weaker tha B3.
We will then describe Burgess accessibility models in §3. §4 introduces the idea of
using as close and nearly as close relations to think about counterfactual accessibility. §5
catalogues various useful properties of these relations. In §6, wewill use those properties
to give several new characterization results. The bulk of the technical material is then
in the last two sections. §7 shows how to prove both soundness and inverse soundness.
§8 shows how to prove completeness and decidability using a new canonical models
16. Youmight think that the inference fails because you determinately prefer three dollars to two dollars
and determinately prefer two dollars to one dollar, but neither determinately prefer one beer to one dollar
nor determinately prefer three dollars to one beer. Thus, (5) and (6) are determinately true, but neither (7)
nor (8) is determinately true. But while this situation can arise, this is not a counterexample to Diamond.
For Diamond to fail, we would need the disjunction of (7) and (8) to be indeterminate, but I can see no
reason to think that it is. At best, we only have a case in which both disjuncts are indeterminate.
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construction.
2 The Paradox of Counterfactual Tolerance
Planck lengths are incredibly small. You would quite literally need a billion trillion of
them just to span the diameter of a proton. Now consider Barack Obama who is, it
turns out, exactly ℎ Planck lengths tall. It would then seem that:
Tolerance: For all positive integers 𝑛 > ℎ, had Obama been at least 𝑛
Planck lengths, he might have been at least 𝑛 + 1 Planck
lengths.
Boundedness: There are positive integers 𝑘 > 𝑗 > ℎ such that hadObama
been at least 𝑗Planck lengths, hewouldnot have been at least
𝑘 Planck lengths.
Heights: For all positive integers 𝑛, had Obama been at least 𝑛 + 1
Planck lengths, hewould have been at least𝑛Planck lengths.
Tolerance says that had Obama been at least seven feet, he might have been at least
one Planck length taller, and likewise for other heights. Boundedness will be true if, for
example, hadObama been at least seven feet, he would not have been at least a thousand
feet. Heights says that had Obama been at least seven feet and one Planck length, he
would have been at least seven feet, and likewise for other heights.
Given these three attractive claims, we can prove a flat contradiction using any
system extendingB3. First, we observe that Limited Transitivity is valid in not onlyB3,
but any system extending B1.17
LT (𝐴 𝐵) ∧ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 𝐶)
Besides being derivable, the principle is also compelling in its own right, and so often
taken as basic, even in systems that are not extensions of B1.18
This gives us everything we need to sketch the paradox. Suppose that Obama is in
fact exactly ℎ Planck lengths tall. For all 𝑛, let 𝑝𝑛 express the claim that Obama is at
least 𝑛 Planck lengths tall. We then reason as follows:
17. This is proved in Lemma 8.7.
18. See for example Kit Fine’s (2012).
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1. 𝑝𝑗  ¬𝑝𝑘 boundedness
2. 𝑝𝑗  𝑝𝑗+1 tolerance
3. 𝑝𝑗+1  𝑝𝑗 heights
4. 𝑝𝑗 ∧ 𝑝𝑗+1  ¬𝑝𝑘 1,2, SM
5. 𝑝𝑗+1 ∧ 𝑝𝑗  ¬𝑝𝑘 4, SUB
6. 𝑝𝑗+1  ¬𝑝𝑘 3, 5, LT
This argument is paradoxical because the reasoning used in lines two through six can
be iterated. In particular, after 𝑘 − 𝑗 − 1 iterations, we get:
𝑝𝑘−1  ¬𝑝𝑘 (9)
But tolerance tells us that
𝑝𝑘−1  𝑝𝑘 (10)
which is equivalent to
¬(𝑝𝑘−1  ¬𝑝𝑘) (11)
and so we have a flat contradiction. Thus, something has to go. Either we have to reject
one of the premises or we have to reject one of the rules or axioms of B3.
There are many strategies for responding to the paradox, several of which I consider
at length in my (2021).19 Rather than repeating that discussion here, I will simply note
that denying StrengthenMight is one natural solution and, in fact, my own preferred
solution. We thus have good reason to be interested in systems strictly weaker than B3.
3 Burgess Models
A natural thought is that counterfactuals should be modeled in terms of the relative
closeness of possible worlds. Maybe 𝐴 𝐵 is true if and only if all of the closest 𝐴
worlds are𝐵worlds. Similarly,𝐴 𝐵 is true if and only some closest𝐴world is also
a 𝐵 world.20
There are different ways of converting this intuitive idea into a formal model theory.
Lewis (1973a) uses systems of spheres. Stalnaker (1968) uses selection functions. Here,
19. For example, one response would be to deny that would andmight counterfactuals are duals. But in
fact, this does not solve the problem, since there are other ways of staging the paradox that do not depend
on duality. I say more about this in the referenced paper.
20. Following the usual convention, an 𝐴 world is just a world at which 𝐴 is true.
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we are going to use Burgess models, which are most general. These were introduced by
John Burgess in his (1981).
Definition 3.1: A frame ℱ = ⟨𝑊, 𝑓, ≤⟩ consists of a non-empty set of worlds 𝑊,
a function 𝑓 assigning every world 𝑥 a local domain 𝑊𝑥 ⊆ 𝑊, and a function ⪯
assigning every world 𝑥 an accessibility relation ⪯𝑥 ⊆ 𝑊𝑥 × 𝑊𝑥.
The worlds in the local domain 𝑊𝑥 of 𝑥 are the worlds that are counterfactually
possible relative to 𝑥. For each such world, there is a corresponding two-place
accessibility relation⪯𝑥 on that local domain. When 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎, we say that 𝑏 is accessible
from 𝑎 relative to 𝑥. We can then define other useful relations:
𝑏 ≺𝑥 𝑎 iff 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 and not 𝑎 ⪯𝑥 𝑏
𝑏 ≈𝑥 𝑎 iff 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 and 𝑎 ⪯𝑥 𝑏
𝑏 ∼𝑥 𝑎 iff 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 or 𝑎 ⪯𝑥 𝑏
The first is the relation of 𝑏 being strictly accessible from 𝑎 relative to 𝑥. The second
is the relation of 𝑏 and 𝑎 being coaccessible relative to 𝑥. The third is the relation of 𝑏
and 𝑎 being connected relative to 𝑥.
These various relations can all be thought of as relative closeness relations. We will
say more about this in §4 but, at a first pass, 𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎 says that 𝑏 is at least as close as 𝑎 to 𝑥.
𝑏 ≺ 𝑎 says that 𝑏 is strictly closer than 𝑎 to 𝑥. 𝑏 ≈𝑥 𝑎 says that 𝑏 and 𝑎 are equally close
to 𝑥. 𝑏 ∼𝑥 𝑎 says that the distance of 𝑏 from 𝑥 is commensurable with the distance of
𝑎 from 𝑥. Finally, when 𝑎 ∈ 𝑊𝑥, this means that the distance of 𝑎 from 𝑥 is defined.
Definition 3.2: ABurgessmodelℳ = ⟨ℱ, 𝑉 ⟩ consists of a frameℱ and a valuation
function𝑉 assigning every atomic sentence 𝑝 ofℒ a denotation𝑉 (𝑝) ⊆ 𝑊. A sentence
𝐴 is true at a world 𝑥 in a model ℳ when ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴, which is defined recursively:
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝑝 iff 𝑥 ∈ 𝑉 (𝑝)
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ ¬𝐴 iff 𝑥 ̸⊧𝐴
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 iff 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 or 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐵
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 iff 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 and 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐵
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵 iff 𝑥 ̸⊧𝐴 or 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐵
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 𝐵 iff for every 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴 such that 𝑎 ∈ 𝑁𝑥, there is a 𝑏 ⊧ 𝐴
such that 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 and, for all 𝑐 such that 𝑐 ⪯𝑥 𝑏, if
𝑐 ⊧ 𝐴 then 𝑐 ⊧ 𝐵
ℳ, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 𝐵 iff there is an𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴 such that𝑎 ∈ 𝑁𝑥 and, for all 𝑏 ⊧ 𝐴
such that 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎, there is a 𝑐 such that 𝑐 ⪯𝑥 𝑏 with
𝑐 ⊧ 𝐴 and 𝑐 ⊧ 𝐵
Once we have our models, soundness and completeness are defined in the usual
way. That is, a system 𝑆 is sound in a frameℱwhen every theorem of 𝑆 is true at every
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world in every model based on ℱ. A system 𝑆 is sound in a class of frames Γ when 𝑆
is sound in every frame in Γ. A set of sentences Δ is 𝑆-consistent when no sentence of
the form 𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐴 can be derived in 𝑆 from any subset of Δ. A system 𝑆 is complete
in a class of frames Γ when every 𝑆-consistent set of sentences is true at some world
in some model based on some frame in Γ. Finally, we will say that a class of frames Γ
generates a system 𝑆 when 𝑆 is sound and complete in Γ.
The class of all frames whatsoever generates a system that we will call B0. This
system is of some technical interest, but is too weak to be a goodmatch for our ordinary
counterfactual practice. For example, B0 fails to license Identity. But surely, if there are
any logical truths involving counterfactuals, one of them is that had it been that 𝐴, it
would have been that 𝐴.
Because the logic of B0 is so weak, we need to add restrictions on the accessibility
relation to generate more realistic systems. Some of the conditions most commonly
used in the literature are listed below.
Property Definition
Reflexive 𝑎 ⪯ 𝑎
Pairwise Connected (𝑎 ⪯ 𝑏) ∨ (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎)
Anti-Symmetric (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎) ⊃ ¬(𝑎 ⪯ 𝑏)
Symmetric (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑎 ⪯ 𝑏)
Fully Transitive (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑎)
Preorder reflexive, fully transitive
Total Preorder pairwise connected, fully transitive
Total Order pairwise connected, fully transitive, anti-symmetric
Universal pairwise connected, symmetric
The general consensus has been that at a minimum, we should require accessibility
relations to be reflexive and transitive. That is, the consensus has been that we should
require accessibility relations to form a preorder. The most common systems are then
generated by restricting to various classes of preorders.21
Definition 3.3: A sequences ⟨𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, … ⟩ forms an infinite chainwhen 𝑎𝑛+1 ⪯
𝑎𝑛 for all 𝑛.
Definition 3.4: An infinite chain ⟨𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3, … ⟩ is trivialwhen 𝑎𝑛 = 𝑎𝑚 for all 𝑛
21. Here, and elsewhere, wewill sometimes run together the distinction between frames and accessibility
relations. We will say, for example, that B1 is generated by the class of all preorders, when what we really
mean is that B1 is generated by the class of all frames in which every world is assigned an accessibility
relation that forms a preorder.
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and 𝑚.
Definition 3.5: A relation iswell-founded (wf) when it does not contain any non-
trivial infinite chains.
Theorem 3.6 (Burgess): B1 is generated by the class of all preorders.
Theorem 3.7 (Lewis): B3 is generated by the class of all total preorders.
Theorem 3.8 (Stalnaker): B4 is generated by the class of all well-founded total orders.
Theorem 3.9 (Kripke): B5 is generated by the class of all universal relations.
The problem is that while using preorders to model counterfactuals is natural and
useful, it can also be misleading. For while certain systems may be generated by certain
classes of preorders, they are not characterized by them. There is thus a clear sense in
which the systems and the classes of frames are not an exact match.
Definition 3.10: A system 𝑆 is inverse sound in a class of frames Γ when 𝑆 is not
sound in any frame not in Γ.
Definition 3.11: A system 𝑆 is exactly sound in a class of frames Γ when 𝑆 is both
sound and inverse sound in Γ.
Definition 3.12: A system 𝑆 characterizes a class of frames Γ relative to class of
frames Δ when 𝑆 is exactly sound in Δ ∩ Γ and 𝑆 is complete in Δ ∩ Γ.
Definition 3.13: A system 𝑆 fully characterizes a class of frames Γ when 𝑆 charac-
terizes Γ relative to the class of all frames.
Characterization is stronger than soundness and completeness. To show that a
system is characterized by a class, we need to show that it is not just sound and complete,
but exactly sound and complete.22 This lets us make several observations.
Proposition 3.14: B1 is not fully characterized by the class of all preorders.
Proposition 3.15: B3 is not fully characterized by the class of all total preorders.
Proposition 3.16: B5 is not fully characterized by the class of all universal relations.
Proof. These three propositions can be demonstrated by considering the following
frame. Accessibility relations are represented by arrows.
𝑎 𝑏 𝑐
Here, 𝑐 and 𝑏 are coaccessible and 𝑏 and𝑎 are coaccessible, but 𝑐 and𝑎 are not connected,
22. We will generally treat characterization as a symmetric relation. So, when a system characterizes a
class of frames, we will also say that the class of frames characterizes the system.
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with these accessibility relations all holding relative to some fixed 𝑥. As a result, this
frame is not fully transitive. Still, B1, B3, and B5 are all sound in this frame by
Theorem7.20.23 Thus, noneof these systems is characterizedby any fully transitive class
of frames. Preorders are fully transitive. So none of these systems is fully characterized
by any class of preorders. 
Theorem 3.17: B4 is fully characterized by the class of well-founded total orders.
Proof. Soundness and completeness are by Theorem 3.8. The inverse of soundness is
straightforward, so left to the reader. 
There is nothing wrong with using a class of models that merely generates a system.
We have soundness and completeness after all! Still, proving characterization results
can be illuminating.
When a class of frames merely generates a system, that class has what you might
think of as unnecessary structure. This unnecessary structure may be useful and is
generally harmless, but is also not needed to support the theorems of the system being
modelled. When a class of frames characterizes a class of frames, on the other hand, that
class has all and only the structure needed to support the theorems. The system and
the class of frames exactly match. We thus have good reason to want characterization
results, and not just soundness and completeness results, whenever we can get them.
Tomy knowledge, there are no existing full characterization results for B1, B3, and
B5 in the literature. In what follows, then, one of our goals will be to fill in this gap.
This is in addition to our main focus, which is giving characterization results for the
new systems B1.1, B1.2, and B2.
4 Nearly as Close
We are going to introduce several new frame conditions in the coming sections, many
of which are non-transitive. To get a feel for how these conditions work, and how they
might be motivated, it will be helpful to distinguish between two kinds of distance
relations.
Imagine that you are standing in the middle of a grassy field and are surrounded by
several brightly colored balls arranged at various distances. These balls stand in as close
23. The frame here is only partially specified, but I trust that the reader can fill in the details. The stated
results hold, for example, if no other worlds are counterfactually possible relative to any other worlds. As
we go along, I will give only partial descriptions of frames and countermodels when filling in the rest of
the details would be straightforward.
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relations. It might be, for example, that the blue ball is as close as the red ball.24 If the
red ball is also as close as the blue ball, then the two balls are equally close. If not, then
the blue ball is strictly closer than the red ball.
Besides standing in as close relations, the balls in the grassy field also stand in nearly
as close relations. We will say that 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎 to 𝑥 when 𝑏 is no more than
𝑡 farther away than 𝑎 from 𝑥. The value of 𝑡 is what we will call the tolerance margin.
So for example, suppose there is a red ball that is three feet away and a blue ball that
is four feet away. Suppose also that the tolerance margin is one foot. In that case, the
blue ball is not as close as the red ball, but it is still nearly as close, since its additional
distance is within the tolerance margin.
In ordinary contexts, whenwe say that something is nearly as close, this often implies
that it is not as close. For example, if you tell a friend that the coffee shop is nearly as
close as the bakery, this will often imply that the coffee shop is not as close as the bakery.
Whether this implication is semantic or pragmatic is an interesting question. For our
purposes, we are going to stipulate that there is no such implication. If 𝑏 is nearly as
close as 𝑎, it could be that 𝑏 is as close as 𝑎. It could even be that 𝑏 is strictly closer.
We can now define other useful relations. We will say that 𝑏 ismuch closer than 𝑎
when 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎 and 𝑎 is not nearly as close as 𝑏. The distance of 𝑏 and the
distance of 𝑎 is roughly equalwhen 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎 and 𝑎 is nearly as close as 𝑏.
So for example, suppose again that we have a one foot tolerance margin. In that
case, the blue ball is much closer than the red ball if and only if it is more than one foot
closer. The distance of the two balls is roughly equal if and only if neither is more than
one foot closer than the other.
The main observation now is that while as close relations are transitive, nearly as
close relations are not. Suppose that 𝑎 is three feet away, 𝑏 is four feet away, and 𝑐 is five
feet away. In that case, using a one foot tolerance margin, 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎 and 𝑐
is nearly as close as 𝑏, but 𝑐 is not nearly as close as 𝑎. In fact, 𝑎 is much closer.
Oncewehavebothkinds of relations on the table, we can think about counterfactual
accessibility using either as close or nearly as close relations. The reading in terms of as
close relations was given early. In terms of nearly as close relations, 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 says that 𝑏
is nearly as close as 𝑎 to 𝑥. 𝑏 ≺𝑥 𝑎 says that 𝑏 is much closer than 𝑎 to 𝑥. 𝑏 ≈𝑥 𝑎 says
that the distance of 𝑏 from 𝑥 and the distance of 𝑎 from 𝑥 is roughly equal. 𝑏 ∼𝑥 𝑎
says that the distance of 𝑏 from 𝑥 and the distance of 𝑎 from 𝑥 is commensurable.
24. When we say one ball is as close as another in English, this claim is often ambiguous. Sometimes,
we mean that the first as at least as close as the second. Sometimes we mean that the first is exactly as close
as the second. For our purposes, we will stipulate that we always have the first reading in mind.
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5 Properties of Closeness Relations
There is by now a long tradition of thinking about counterfactuals in terms of as close
relations. Say that an 𝐴 world is among the closest 𝐴 worlds when there are no other
𝐴 worlds that are strictly closer. The usual thought is that, given the limit assumption,
𝐴 𝐵 is true iff all of the closest 𝐴 worlds are 𝐵 worlds. Similarly, 𝐴 𝐵 is true
iff some of the closest 𝐴 worlds are 𝐵 worlds.
The problem is that as close relations are pairwise connected and fully transitive.
Thus, if wemodel counterfactuals using as close relations, wewill generate Lewis’sB3.25
But as we saw in §2, we can use B3 to prove a contradiction from Tolerance, Bounded-
ness, and Heights. Thus, those of us who accept Tolerance, Boundedness, and Heights
are committed to denying B3, and so committed to denying that counterfactuals can
be correctly modeled using as close relations.
Ifwe arenot going tomodel counterfactuals usingas close relations, thenhowshould
we model them? What I think is that we should replace as close relations with nearly as
close relations.26
Say that an 𝐴 world is among the nearly closest 𝐴 worlds when there are no 𝐴
worlds that are much closer. Given the limit assumption,𝐴 𝐵 is then true iff all of
the nearly closest 𝐴 worlds are 𝐵 worlds. 𝐴 𝐵 is true iff some of the nearly closest
𝐴 worlds are 𝐵 worlds.
Since nearly as close relations are not fully transitive, modeling counterfactuals with
nearly as close relationsmeans denying that counterfactual accessibility is fully transitive.
We thus cannot require counterfactual accessibility relations to be preorders. Instead,
I think we should require them to be semiorders. If we do, the system that will be
generated is B2.27
In the rest of this section, we are going to catalogue several properties of nearly as
close and as close relations. These can be broadly divided into three kinds: transitivity
properties, connectedness properties, and directedness properties. Once we have a
suitable catalogue of properties, we will use said properties to give our characterization
results in §6.
5.1 Transitivity Properties
A transitivity property is a non-trivial property that is entailed by full transitivity.
Thus, full transitivity is itself one example of a transitivity property, but not the only
25. This is one of the upshots of Theorem 6.20.
26. See my (2021) for a more detailed discussion.
27. This is one of the implications of Theorem 6.20.
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one. There are many others.
Property Definition
Left Transitive (𝑐 ≺ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑎)
Right Transitive (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑎)
Strong Left Transitive (𝑐 ≺ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑐 ≺ 𝑎)
Strong Right Transitive (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑐 ≺ 𝑎)
Double Transitive (𝑐 ≺ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑐 ≺ 𝑎)
Zigzag Transitive (𝑑 ≺ 𝑐) ∧ (𝑐 ⪯ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑑 ≺ 𝑎)
Double Left Transitive (𝑑 ≺ 𝑐) ∧ (𝑐 ≺ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ⪯ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑑 ≺ 𝑎)
Double Right Transitive (𝑑 ⪯ 𝑐) ∧ (𝑐 ≺ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑑 ≺ 𝑎)
Weak Transitive left transitive, right transitive
Strong Transitive strong left transitive, strong right transitive
Semitransitive zigzag transitive, double left transitive, double right tran-
sitive
The first pair of transitivity properties are left transitivity and right transitivity.





Left Transitive Right Transitive
In this diagram, and the ones to follow, solid arrows represent accessibility relations that
appear in the antecedent. Dotted arrows represents accessibility relations that appear
in the consequent. Arrows with a single tip represent accessibility relations that may
or may not be strict. Arrows with a double tip represent accessibility relations that are
strict.
In terms of nearly as close relations, left transitivity says that if 𝑐 is much closer than
𝑏 and 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎, then 𝑐 is nearly as close as 𝑎. Right transitivity says that
if 𝑐 is nearly as close as 𝑏 and 𝑏 is much closer that 𝑎, then 𝑐 is nearly as close as 𝑎. A
relation is weakly transitive when it is both left transitive and weak right transitive.
The second pair of properties are strong left transitivity and strong right transitivity.
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Strong Left Transitive Strong Right Transitive
Thinking in terms ofas close relations, strong left transitivity says that if 𝑐 is strictly closer
than 𝑏 and 𝑏 is as close as 𝑎, then 𝑐 is strictly closer than 𝑎. Strong right transitivity says
that if 𝑐 is as close as 𝑏 and 𝑏 is strictly closer than 𝑎, then 𝑐 is strictly closer than 𝑎. When
a relation is both strong left transitive and strong right transitive, we will say that it is
strongly transitive.
Strong left transitivity fails for nearly as close relations. To see this, suppose that 𝑐
is three feet away, 𝑎 is four feet away, and 𝑏 is five feet away. Using a one-foot tolerance
margin, 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎 and 𝑐 is much closer than 𝑏, but 𝑐 is not much closer
than 𝑎. Thus, strong left transitivity fails. A similar countermodel shows that strong
right transitivity also fails.
Observation 5.1: Every strongly left transitive relation is left transitive.28
Observation 5.2: Every strongly right transitive relation is right transitive.
The fifth property on our list is double transitivity. This property is called double
transitivity because it takes two strict accessibility relation as input, then gives back a
third strict accessibility relation as output.
28. Here and elsewhere, I will call especially straightforward propositions observations. Proofs of






In terms of nearly as close relations, double transitivity says that if 𝑐 is much closer than
𝑏 and 𝑏 is much closer than 𝑎, then 𝑐 is much closer than 𝑎.
Observation 5.3: If a relation is either right transitive or left transitive, then it is also
double transitive.
Observation 5.4: If a relation is pairwise connected and double transitive, then it is
also weak transitive.
The sixth property is zigzag transitivity. Unlike the other properties considered so
far, zigzag transitivity takes three accessibility relations as input, then gives us a strict





In terms of nearly as close relations, zigzag transitivity says that if 𝑑 is much closer than
𝑐 and 𝑐 is nearly as close as 𝑏 and 𝑏 is much closer than 𝑎, then 𝑑 is much closer than 𝑎.
The last two basic transitivity properties are double left transitivity and double right
transitivity. These are like zigzag transitivity, but permute the patterns of strict and non-
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Double Left Transitive Double Right Transitive
Thinking in terms of nearly as close relations, double left transitivity says that if 𝑑 is
much closer than 𝑐 and 𝑐 is much closer than 𝑏 and 𝑏 is nearly as close as 𝑎, then 𝑑 is
much closer than 𝑎. Double right transitivity says that if 𝑑 is nearly as close as 𝑐 and 𝑐
is much closer than 𝑏 and 𝑏 is much closer than 𝑎, then 𝑑 is much closer than 𝑎. When
a relation is zigzag transitive, double left transitive, and double right transitive, we will
say that it is semitransitive.
Observation 5.5: If a relation is reflexive and semitransitive, then it is also double
transitive.
Observation 5.6: If a relation is pairwise connected and semitransitive, then it is also
weakly transitive.
5.2 Connectedness Properties
A property is a connectedness propertywhen it is a non-trivial property entailed by
pairwise connectedness. Pairwise connectedness, then, is one example of a connected-
ness property, but not the only one. There are many others as well.
Property Definition
Bowtie Connected (𝑑 ≺ 𝑐) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑑 ∼ 𝑎) ∨ (𝑏 ∼ 𝑐)
Diamond Connected (𝑐 ≺ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑑 ∼ 𝑐) ∨ (𝑑 ∼ 𝑎)
Triangle Connected (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑐 ∼ 𝑏) ∨ (𝑐 ∼ 𝑎)
Bowtie connectedness says that given any pair of strict accessibility relations, one








In terms of nearly as close relations, bowtie connectedness says that if 𝑑 is much closer
than 𝑐 and 𝑏 is much closer than 𝑎, then either 𝑑 and 𝑎 are commensurable or 𝑏 and 𝑐
are commensurable.
The second property is diamond connectedness. It says that if 𝑏 is much closer than







The last connectedness property is triangle connectedness. Triangle connectedness






Observation 5.7: If a relation is diamond connected, then it is double right transitive
iff it is double left transitive.
Observation 5.8: If a relation is triangle connected, then it is also bowtie connected.
Observation 5.9: If a relation is triangle connected, then it is strongly left transitive
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iff it is strongly right transitive.
5.3 Directedness Properties
What we are going to call directedness properties are what you might think of as
hybrid properties. They generally result from pairing a connectedness property with an
appropriate transitivity property. Alternatively, you might also think of directedness
properties as connectedness properties of the strict accessibility relations.
Directedness properties will be important, for our purposes, because our model
theory is often sensitive to directedness properties, even when it is not sensitive to the
underlying connectedness and transitivity properties, taken individually.
Property Definition
Bowtie Directed (𝑑 ≺ 𝑐) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑑 ≺ 𝑎) ∨ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑐)
Diamond Directed (𝑐 ≺ 𝑏) ∧ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑐 ≺ 𝑑) ∨ (𝑑 ≺ 𝑎)
Triangle Directed (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ⊃ (𝑏 ≺ 𝑐) ∨ (𝑐 ≺ 𝑎)
Pairwise Directed (𝑏 ≺ 𝑎) ∨ (𝑎 ≺ 𝑏)
Our first directedness property is bowtie directedness. It says that if 𝑏 is much closer







When a relation is pairwise connected and bowtie directed, it forms an interval order.
Such relations are called interval orders because they have the same structure as the
intervals on the real line. In particular, let 𝑆 and 𝑇 be any such intervals. We then let
𝑆 ⪯ 𝑇 whenever there is some 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆 and 𝑦 ∈ 𝑇 such that 𝑥 ⪯ 𝑦. The resulting
relation is both pairwise connected and bowtie directed, and so forms an interval order.
Observation 5.10: A relation is bowtie directed iff it is bowtie connected and zigzag
transitive.
The second property is diamond directedness. It says that if 𝑏 is much closer than
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Observation 5.11: A relation is diamond directed iff it is diamond connected, double
left transitive, and double right transitive.
A relation forms a semiorderwhen it is pairwise connected, zigzag transitive, and
diamond directed. Like preorders, semiorders are strictly weaker than total orders, but
they weaken full transitivity rather than pairwise connectedness. They are generally
attributed to Luce (1956), who originally introduced them to model intransitive
preferences.29
Observation 5.12: A relation is a semiorder iff it is pairwise connected and semitran-
sitive.
Observation 5.13: Every semiorder is weakly transitive.
The third relation is triangle directedness, which is also sometimes called almost




29. While semiorders are generally attributed to Luce, they were in fact first introduced almost forty
years earlier by Wiener (1914), a math prodigy who studied under Bertrand Russell and completed his
Ph.D. fromHarvard at the age of eighteen. See Fishburn andMonjardet (1992) for more on this.
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Triangle Directed
In terms of as close relations, triangle directedness says that if 𝑏 is strictly closer than 𝑎,
then either 𝑐 is strictly closer than 𝑎 or 𝑏 is strictly closer than 𝑐.
Observation 5.14: A relation is triangle directed iff it is triangle connected and
strongly transitive.
Observation 5.15: If a relation is triangle directed, then it is also diamond directed
and bowtie directed.
While as close relations are triangle directed, nearly as close relation are not. Suppose
that 𝑏 is three feet away, 𝑐 is four feet away, and 𝑎 is five feet away. Suppose also that the
tolerance margin is one foot. In that case, 𝑏 is much closer than 𝑎, but 𝑐 is not much
closer than 𝑎, nor is 𝑏 much closer than 𝑐.
The last directedness property is pairwise directedness. In terms of as close relations,




Unlike our other directedness properties, pairwise directedness is not the result of
conjoining a connectedness property with a transitivity property. Instead, it is the
result of conjoining pairwise connectedness with anti-symmetry.
Observation 5.16: A relation is pairwise directed iff it is pairwise connected and anti-
symmetric.
Observation 5.17: A pairwise directed relation is a total order iff it is reflexive and left
transitive.
6 Characterization Results
In the last section,we introduced several properties ofas close andnearly as close relations.
In this section, we are going to use those properties to give characterization results.
This will be done in two steps. First, we will give characterization results for finite
frames. These are important because, among other things, they entail corresponding
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decidability results. We will then deal with certain difficulties raised by infinite frames,
which will let us give full characterization results.
6.1 Finite Frames
§8 will show how to prove completeness using a new canonical models construction.
That procedure if different from, but in many way complementary to, the step-by-step
procedure given by Burgess (1981).
As youwill see in §8, the new canonicalmodals procedure builds pairwise connected
models for any set of sentences that are consistent in B1.1. The Burgess step-by-step
procedure, on the other hand, builds fully transitive models for any set of sentences
that are consistent in B1. As a result, it is helpful to be able to switch back and forth
between the two. To build models that are pairwise connected, but not fully transitive,
we can use the canonical models procedure. To build models that are fully transitive,
but not pairwise connected, we can use the step-by-step procedure.
We are going to start by describing what we can show using the canonical models
procedure. The results for B3-B5 are already known. The results for B1.1 and B2 are
new.
Definition 6.1: A frame is finite when the domain of worlds is finite. Otherwise, a
frame is infinite.
Theorem 6.2: When restricting to the class of finite frames that are pairwise connected,
each system on the left is characterized by the class listed in the center. The class or pairwise
connected relations meeting this condition is also known by the condition listed on the
right.
System Added Condition AKA
B1.1 zigzag transitive interval order
B2 semitransitive semiorder
B3 fully transitive total partial order
B4 fully transitive, anti-symmetric total order
B5 fully transitive, symmetric universal relation
Proof. Exact soundness is byTheorem7.20, since the conditions listed here are stronger
than the conditions listed there. Completeness is by Theorem 8.15. 
Corollary 6.3: B1.1-B5 are decidable.
Proof. Immediate by Theorem 6.2. 
Suppose we start with the assumption that accessibility relations are always pairwise
connected. The above theorem then tells uswhich systemswe can generate by imposing
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additional transitivity requirements. If we add zigzag transitivity, we get B1.1. If we
add semitransitivity, we get B2. If we add full transitivity, we get B3.
Theorem 6.2 also demonstrates the usefulness of our new canonical models proce-
dure. If we could only build models that were fully transitive, then we could not prove
the first two lines of the table. This is because there are consistent sets of sentences in
both B1.1 and B2whose only models are not total preorders.
If we assume pairwise connectedness for counterfactual accessibility, there is an
especially natural analogy between Strengthen Might and the S4 axiom from modal
logic.30. After all, ifwe adopt pairwise connectedness for counterfactual accessibility as a
background assumption, each of those axioms characterizes the class of fully transitive
frames. Thus, while the two axioms have very different syntax, they turn out to be
similar from a model-theoretic perspective.
On reflection, this is perhaps not surprising, given that our motivation for denying
StrengthenMightwas the paradoxof counterfactual tolerance, and tolerance arguments
of various kinds are often deployed against S4.31
Theorem 6.4: When restricting to the class of finite frames that are preorders, each
system on the left is characterized by the class listed in the center. The class of preorders
listed in the center is also known by the condition listed on the right.




B2 bowtie connected, diamond connected
B3 triangle connected
B4 pairwise connected, anti-symmetric total order
B5 symmetric universal relation
Proof. Exact soundness is byTheorem7.20, since the conditions listed here are stronger
than the conditions listed there. Completeness can be shown using the Burgess step-
by-step procedure. 
Corollary 6.5: B1-B5 are decidable.
Proof. Immediate by Theorem 6.4. 
Suppose that we start with the assumption that accessibility relations are always
fully transitive. The above table then tells us which systems we can generate by adding
30. The S4 axiom says that2(𝐴) ⊃ 22(𝐴).
31. See for example Chandler (1976), Salmon (1979), andWilliamson (1992).
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various connectedness requirements. The results for B.1-B3 are new. The other results
are already known, though they are usually framed as soundness and completeness
results, rather than relativized characterization results.
Theorem 6.4 demonstrates the usefulness of having the Burgess step-by-step pro-
cedure in addition to our canonical models procedure. If we only had the canonical
models construction, we would only be able to build pairwise connected models. But
in that case, we would not be able to prove most of the lines in the above table.
Theorem 6.2 and Theorem 6.4 tell us which systems can be characterized, given
that we have as a background assumption that the domain of worlds is finite and that
we either assume that accessibility relations are always pairwise connected, or that we
assume that they are always fully transitive. What happens, though, if we relax those
assumptions? What if we only assume that the domain is finite? In that case, B1-B5
are characterized using the frame conditions listed in Theorem 6.7.
Definition 6.6: A relation is a left orderwhen it is reflexive and left transitive.
Theorem 6.7 (Characterization for Finite Frames): When restricting to the class of
finite frames, each system on the left is characterized by the class of left orders in the center.
The class of left orders meeting that condition is also known by the condition listed on the
right.
System Added Condition AKA
B1 zigzag transitive
B1.1 bowtie directed
B1.2 zigzag transitive, diamond directed
B2 bowtie directed, diamond directed
B3 triangle directed
B4 pairwise directed total order
B5 symmetric
Proof. Exact soundness is byTheorem7.20, since the conditions listed here are stronger
than the conditions listed there. Completeness forB1.1 andB3-B5 is byTheorem8.15,
since the conditions listed here are weaker than the conditions listed there. Complete-
ness for B1 and B1.2 is by Theorem 6.4. 
Most of the results in Theorem 6.7 are new, including those for the new systems
B1.1 -B2, as well as those for the old systemsB1, B3, andB5. GivenObservation 5.17,
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the result for B4 is just Theorem 3.17 in another guise, and so this line of the table is
already known.
6.2 Infinite Frames
We have shown that B1-B5 are characterized by various frame conditions, so long as
we restrict our attention to finite frames. While this is a good start, we would also like
to allow for infinite frames. This requires additional work.
Definition 6.8: The worlds 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 and 𝑑 form a bowtie cyclewhen 𝑑 ≺ 𝑐 and 𝑏 ≺ 𝑎





Thinking in terms of nearly as close relations, four worlds form a bowtie cycle when
𝑑 is much closer than 𝑐 and 𝑏 is much closer than 𝑎 but, nevertheless, 𝑎 is nearly as close
as 𝑑 and 𝑐 is nearly as close as 𝑏.
We can rule out bowtie cycles by accepting zigzag transitivity. The problem is that
once we allow for infinite models, there can still be infinite sequences of worlds that
look just like bowtie cycles, at least from the perspective of the model theory. These
sequences are what we are going to call bowtie sequences. Thus, once we allow for
infinite frames, B1 is no longer sound with respect to the class of all left orders that are
zigzag transitive.32
Definition 6.9: A bowtie sequence ⟨𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑑1, 𝑎2, 𝑏2 … ⟩ is an infinite chain
such that 𝑎𝑛⪯̸𝑏𝑚 and 𝑐𝑛⪯̸𝑑𝑚 for all 𝑛 and 𝑚.
Definition 6.10: A relation is bowtie well-founded (bwf) when it does not have any
bowtie sequences.
There is a similar challenge when it comes to characterizing B2. In particular, if we
allow for infinite frames, B2 is no longer sound with respect to the class of all diamond




Definition 6.11: The worlds 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 and 𝑑 form a diamond cycle when 𝑐 ≺ 𝑏 and





Four worlds form a diamond cycle when 𝑏 is much closer than 𝑎 and 𝑐 is much
closer than 𝑏 but, nevertheless, 𝑑 is nearly as close as 𝑐 and 𝑎 is nearly as close as 𝑑.
Diamond directedness rules out diamond cycles, which is needed to ensure that
B2 is sound. The problem is that if we allow for infinite frames, there can be certain
infinite sequences that look just like diamond cycles, at least so far as the model theory
is concerned. We will call these sequences diamond sequences.
Definition 6.12: A diamond sequence ⟨𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑑1, 𝑎2, 𝑏2 … ⟩ is an infinite chain
such that 𝑎𝑛⪯̸𝑥𝑏𝑚 and 𝑏𝑛⪯̸𝑥𝑐𝑚 for all 𝑛 and 𝑚.
Definition 6.13: A relation is diamond well-founded (dwf) when it does not have
any diamond sequences.
Observation 6.14: If relation is fully transitive, then it is bowtie well-founded and
diamond well-founded.
Observation 6.15: If relation is pairwise connected, then it is zigzag transitive iff it is
bowtie well-founded.
Observation 6.16: If relation is pairwise connected, then it is diamond transitive iff
it is diamond well-founded.
There is a familiar, and related, problem when it comes to characterizing B4. For
while B4 is sound in the class of all total orders, so long as we have only finite frames,
33. This follows from Proposition 7.16 given that there are left orders that are diamond directed, but
not diamond well-founded.
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it is not sound in the class of all total orders, once we allow for infinite frames. The
problem is that infinite sequences of strict accessibility relations look just like symmetric
accessibility relations from the perspective of the model theory.
Definition 6.17: A loop sequence ⟨𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3 … ⟩ is an infinite chain such that
𝑎𝑛⪯̸𝑥𝑎𝑚 for all 𝑛 < 𝑚.
Definition 6.18: A relation satisfies the limit assumption (lma) when it does not
have any loop sequences.
Observation 6.19: If a relation is well-founded, then it satisfies the limit assumption,
is bowtie well-founded iff it is zigzag transitive, and is diamond well-founded iff it is
diamond directed.
We are now in a position to give results analogous to Theorems 6.2-6.7 while
allowing for infinite frames.
Theorem 6.20: When restricting to the class of frames that are pairwise connected, each
system on the left is characterized by the class listed in the center. This class is also known
by the condition listed on the right.
System Added Condition AKA
B1.1 zigzag transitive interval order
B2 semitransitive semiorder
B3 fully transitive total partial order
B4 fully transitive, anti-symmetric, lma wf total order
B5 fully transitive, symmetric universal relation
Proof. Exact soundness is byTheorem7.20, since the conditions listed here are stronger
than the conditions listed there. Completeness is byTheorem8.15, since the conditions
listed here are weaker than the conditions listed there. 
Theorem 6.20 is almost exactly like Theorem 6.2, the only difference being that the
limit assumption is needed to characterizeB4. The reason that the two theorems are so
similar is Observation 6.15 and Observation 6.16. These tell us that so long as we have
pairwise connectedness as a background assumption, zigzag transitivity is equivalent
to bowtie well-foundedness and diamond directedness is equivalent to diamond well-
foundedness. There is thus no need to appeal to these as additional constraints when
characterizing B1 and B2.
Theorem 6.21: When restricting to the class of preorders, each system on the left is
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characterized by the class listed in the center. This class is also known by the condition
listed on the right.




B2 bowtie connected, diamond connected
B3 triangle connected
B4 pairwise connected, anti-symmetric, lma wf total order
B5 symmetric universal relation
Proof. Exact soundness is byTheorem7.20, since the conditions listed here are stronger
than the conditions listed there. Completeness is by Theorem 6.4, since the conditions
here are strictly weaker than the conditions listed there. 
Again, Theorem 6.21 is almost exactly the same as Theorem 6.4, with the only
difference being that we need the limit assumption to characterize B4. In this case, the
similarity is explained by Observation 6.14, which tells us that transitivity on its own
entails bowtie well-foundedness and diamond well-foundedness.
Theorem 6.22 (Full Characterization): Each of the systems on the left is fully character-
ized by the class of left orders listed in the center. That class is also known by the condition
listed on the right.
System Added Condition AKA
B1 zigzag transitive, bwf
B1.1 bowtie directed, bwf
B1.2 zigzag transitive, diamond directed, bwf, dwf
B2 bowtie directed, diamond directed, bwf, dwf
B3 triangle directed
B4 pairwise directed, lma wf total order
B5 symmetric
Proof. Exact soundness is by Theorem 7.20. Completeness is by Theorem 6.7, since
the conditions here are weaker than the conditions listed there. 
All of the results listed in Theorem 6.22 are new. As you can see, once we are
no longer assuming either full transitivity or pairwise connectedness, bowtie well-
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foundedness and diamond well-foundedness are needed to fully characterize B1-B2.
We also still need the limit assumption to characterize B4.
One implication of this is thatmost of our systems are characterized by second-order
frame conditions, with B3 and B5 being striking exceptions. But while that may be,
there is also an important difference between B1-B2 and B4. Given Theorems 6.20
and 6.21, B1-B2 can be generated using first-order frame conditions, even though they
cannot be characterized using first-order frame conditions. In contrast, B4 can neither
be generated nor characterized using first-order frame conditions. There is thus a clear
sense in which B4 is more deeply second-order than B1-B2.
7 Exact Soundness
Soundness proofs are often straightforward, and so left to the reader. In the present
case, though, the proofs can be somewhat less obvious than usual. As such, I have
included them.
Exact soundness proofs have two steps, and so this section is divided into two parts.
The first half proves soundness. The second half proves inverse soundness.
7.1 Soundness
Say that a world 𝑐 is an example of 𝐴 𝐵 when 𝑐 ⊧ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵. A world 𝑏 is awitness
of 𝐴  𝐵 relative to 𝑥 when 𝑏 ⊧ 𝐴 and every 𝑐 such that 𝑐 ⪯𝑥 𝑏 and 𝑐 ⊧ 𝐴 is an
example. A world 𝑎 confirms 𝐴 𝐵 relative to 𝑥 when 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴 and there is some 𝑏
that is a witness relative to 𝑥 such that 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎.
Similarly, a world 𝑐 is an example of 𝐴  𝐵 when 𝑐 ⊧ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵. A world 𝑏 is a
supporter of 𝐴 𝐵 relative to 𝑥 when 𝑏 ⊧ 𝐴 and there is some 𝑐 such that 𝑐 ⪯ 𝑏
that is an example. A world 𝑎 confirms 𝐴 𝐵 relative to 𝑥 when 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴 and every 𝑏
such that 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 and 𝑏 ⊧ 𝐴 is a supporter.
Putting these definitions together,𝐴 𝐵 is true at a world 𝑥 iff every counterfac-
tually possible 𝐴 world relative to 𝑥 confirms it. Similarly, 𝐴 𝐵 is true at a world
𝑥 iff some counterfactually possible 𝐴 world relative to 𝑥 confirms it.
Observation 7.1: SUB, WEA, and IM are valid in all frames.
Observation 7.2: If a frame is reflexive, ID is valid.
Proposition 7.3: If a frame is reflexive, left transitive, bowtie directed, and bowtie
well-founded, then DI is valid.
Proof. Suppose for reductio that 𝑥 ⊧ (𝐴 𝐶) ∧ (𝐵 𝐶) and 𝑥 ⊧ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵)
¬𝐶. There is thus some 𝑦 that confirms (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵) ¬𝐶 and, given reflexivity, there
is an example 𝑎 such that 𝑎 ⪯ 𝑦. Either 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴 or 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐵. The basic reasoning is the
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same either way, so suppose that 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴. We know that 𝑎 confirms 𝐴  𝐶, since
𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 𝐶, so there is a witness 𝑏 such that 𝑏 ≺𝑥 𝑎, with 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑦 by left transitivity.













Since 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑦, 𝑏 is a supporter of 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵  ¬𝐶, so there is an example 𝑐 such that
𝑐 ⪯𝑥 𝑏. Moreover, since 𝑏 is a witness of 𝐴  𝐶, this means that 𝑐 ⊧ 𝐵 ∧ ¬𝐶.
This world confirms 𝐵  𝐶, since 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐵  𝐶, so there is also a witness 𝑑 such
that 𝑑 ≺𝑥 𝑐. It thus follows that 𝑑 ≺𝑥 𝑎 by zigzag transitivity and 𝑑 ⪯𝑥 𝑦 by left
transitivity.
This last observation means that we will need yet another example 𝑎1 of 𝐴 𝐵,
with this example being such that 𝑎1 ⪯𝑥 𝑑. The problem now is that we cannot stop
with 𝑎1. We in fact need to add a full copy ⟨𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑑1⟩ of the worlds ⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑⟩
on the right of the diagram. Once we do, we will be in a similar position, so will need
to add yet another copy ⟨𝑎2, 𝑏2, 𝑐2, 𝑑2⟩ to the right of that diagram, and so on and so
forth for all 𝑛. The result is a bowtie sequence, which is contrary to the assumption
that the relation is bowtie well-founded. 
Proposition 7.4: If a frame is reflexive, left transitive, bowtie directed, and bowtie
well-founded, then CO is valid.
Proof. By reasoning similar to that used to prove Proposition 7.3. 
Proposition 7.5: If a frame is reflexive, left transitive, and bowtie directed, then DB is
valid.
Proof. Suppose that 𝑥 ⊧ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵  𝐶) and 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴  ¬𝐶 and 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐵  ¬𝐶.
We thus have a world 𝑎 that confirms 𝐴 ¬𝐶 with an example 𝑏 such that 𝑏 ⪯𝑥 𝑎.
Since 𝑏 confirms𝐴∨𝐵 𝐶, there is also a witness 𝑐 such that 𝑐 ≺ 𝑏, with 𝑐 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 by
weak left transitivity. If it were the case that 𝑐 ⊧ 𝐴, there would need to be an example
𝑦 of 𝐴 ¬𝐶 such that 𝑦 ⪯𝑥 𝑐. But this would contradict the fact that 𝑐 witnesses
𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶. So 𝑐 ⊧̸ 𝐴. This gives us the worlds on the top row in the diagram below.
34. Reflexive arrows will generally be left implicit to simplify the diagrams.
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Analogous reasoning gives us the worlds on the bottom, given that there must be a 𝑑













There are now two possibilities given bowtie directedness. These are that 𝑓 ≺𝑥 𝑏 or
𝑐 ≺𝑥 𝑒. Each of these cases leads to contradiction.
First, suppose that 𝑓 ≺𝑥 𝑏. This gives us 𝑓 ⪯𝑥 𝑎 by weak left transitivity, so there
must be an example 𝑦 of𝐴 ¬𝐶 such that 𝑦 ⪯𝑥 𝑓. But this contradicts the fact that
𝑓 witnesses 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶. If we instead suppose that 𝑐 ≺𝑥 𝑒, we get a contradiction
for similar reasons. 
Proposition 7.6: If a frame is reflexive, diamond directed, and diamondwell-founded,
then DM is valid.
Proof. Suppose that 𝑥 ⊧ (𝐴∨𝐵 ¬𝐴)∧(𝐵 ∨𝐶 ¬𝐵) and 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐶 ∨𝐷 𝐶
and 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐷 𝐴. There is thus a 𝑦 that confirms 𝐴 ∨ 𝐷 𝐴 and so a witness
𝑎 such that 𝑎 ⪯𝑥 𝑦. Since 𝑎 confirms 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵  ¬𝐴, there is a witness such that















Since 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐶 ∨ 𝐷 𝐷, there is a 𝑧 that confirms it. By diamond directedness, either
𝑐 ≺𝑥 𝑧 or 𝑎 ≺𝑥 𝑧.
First, suppose that 𝑐 ≺𝑥 𝑧. From this it follows that there is an example 𝑑 of
𝐶 ∨ 𝐷 𝐷 such that 𝑑 ⪯𝑥 𝑐. By diamond connectedness 𝑑 ≺𝑥 𝑎 and so 𝑑 ⪯𝑥 𝑦
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by left transitivity. This means that we need a further example 𝑎1 of 𝐴 ∨ 𝐷  𝐴
such that 𝑎1 ⪯𝑥 𝑑.
The problem is that we are now back where we started. We will thus need to add
not only 𝑎1, but a full copy ⟨𝑎1, 𝑏1, 𝑐1, 𝑑1⟩ of ⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑⟩ on the right. Once we do,
we will need to add yet another copy, and so on and so forth for all 𝑛. The result is a
diamond sequence, which violates diamond well-foundedness.
Now suppose instead that𝑎 ≺𝑥 𝑧. This results in 𝑧 ⪯𝑥 𝑦by left transitivity. In that
case, we will need to construct a similar infinite sequence of worlds, either on the top
line or the bottom line. Since the reasoning in that case is similar, this half of the proof
is left to the reader. Since we once again have a violation of diamond well-foundedness,
the result follows. 
Observation 7.7: If a frame is reflexive and triangle connected, then SM is valid.
Observation 7.8: If a frame is a total order and well-founded, then CEM is valid.
Observation 7.9: If a frame is symmetric, then ST is valid.
7.2 Inverse Soundness
Now that we have shown soundness, we turn to showing the inverse. This is done by
providing several countermodels.
Observation 7.10: If a frame is not reflexive, then ID is not valid.
Proposition 7.11: If a frame is reflexive, but not left transitive, then DI is not valid.








Proposition 7.12: If a frame is not zigzag transitive, then DI is not valid.










Proposition 7.13: If a frame is reflexive, but not bowtie well-founded, then DI is not
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valid.
Proof. Suppose that we have a bowtie sequence extending to the right. The following













The countermodel is just like the one used for Proposition 7.12, except there is a copy
⟨𝑎𝑛, 𝑏𝑛, 𝑐𝑛, 𝑑𝑛⟩ of ⟨𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑⟩ for each 𝑛 pasted on the right. The additional arrows
required by 
Proposition 7.14: If a frame is reflexive, but not bowtie directed, then DB is not valid.
Proof. The following is a countermodel.
𝐴, ¬𝐶𝑎 𝐵, ¬𝐶 𝑏
𝐵, 𝐶𝑑 𝐴, 𝐶 𝑐

Proposition 7.15: If a frame is reflexive, but not diamond directed, then DM is not
valid.







Proposition 7.16: If a frame is reflexive, but not diamond well-founded, then DM is
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not valid.
Proof. The following is a countermodel, with the diamond sequence extending in-














Proposition 7.17: If a frame is reflexive, but not triangle directed, then SM is not valid.
Proof. Consider any frame that is reflexive but not triangle connected. There are thus
worlds 𝑎 and 𝑏 and 𝑐 such that 𝑏 ≺ 𝑎 but neither 𝑐 ≺𝑥 𝑎 nor 𝑐 ≺ 𝑏. There are then two
cases to consider. If not 𝑎 ≺𝑥 𝑐, we can use the countermodel on the left. If 𝑎 ≺𝑥 𝑐,
on the other hand, we can use the countermodel on the right instead.
𝐴, 𝐵, ¬𝐶𝑎
𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶 𝑐
𝐴, 𝐶𝑏
𝐴, 𝐶𝑎
𝐴, 𝐵, ¬𝐶 𝑐
𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶𝑏

Observation 7.18: If a frame is not well-founded, then CEM is not valid.
Observation 7.19: If a frame is not symmetric, then ST is not valid.
Theorem 7.20 (Exact Soundness): Each system on the left is characterized by the class
of left orders meeting the condition listed in the center, which is equivalent to the condition
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listed on the right.
System Frames AKA
B1 zigzag transitive, bwf
B1.1 bowtie directed, bwf
B1.2 diamond directed, dwf, bwf
B2 bowtie directed, diamond directed, dwf, bwf
B3 triangle directed
B4 pairwise directed, lma wf total order
B5 symmetric order
Proof. By the preceding. 
8 Completeness
The most familiar canonical constructions, like those from Henkin (1949), build a
single canonical model that is a model for every consistent sentence. What we are going
to do instead is assign each sentence a type and then, for each type, build a canonical
model that is a model for every consistent sentence of that type. Since we have the
compactness theorem, this means that we can also build a model for every consistent
set of sentences.
In what follows, we are going to show that every set of sentences that is consistent
in B1.1 has not only a model, but a finite model. The basic procedure can be easily
extended to any system extending B1.1. This includes my preferred system B2, along
with B3-B5.
Definition 8.1: Fix an enumeration 𝑝1, 𝑝2, … of the atomic sentence of ℒ. The
atomic type of a sentence 𝐴 is the smallest 𝑛 such that 𝑝1, … , 𝑝𝑛 includes all the
atomic sentences in 𝐴.
Definition 8.2: The modal depth of a sentence 𝐴 is given by 𝑓(𝐴), where this is
defined recursively with:
𝑓(𝐴) = 0 when 𝐴 is an atom.
𝑓(¬𝐴) = 𝑓(𝐴)
𝑓(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) = 𝑓(𝐴 ∨ 𝐵) = 𝑓(𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑓(𝐴), 𝑓(𝐵))
𝑓(𝐴 𝐵) = 𝑓(𝐴 𝐵) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑓(𝐴), 𝑓(𝐵)) + 1
Definition 8.3: The type of a sentence is 𝑡 = ⟨𝑛, 𝑚⟩, where 𝑛 is the atomic type and
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𝑚 is the modal depth.
Definition 8.4: The states of type ⟨𝑛, 𝑚⟩ are the members of 𝑌 𝑛,𝑚, where this set
is defined recursively with:
𝑋𝑛,0 = the set of atomic sentence of type ⟨𝑛, 0⟩
𝑌 𝑛,𝑚 = the set of consistent conjunctions𝐴1∧…∧𝐴𝑛 with𝐴𝑖 being
either 𝐵𝑖 or ¬𝐵𝑖 for the enumerated 𝐵𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑛,𝑚
𝑋𝑛,𝑚+1 = the union of the 𝑋𝑛,𝑚 and all sentences of the form 𝐴 ∨
𝐵 ¬𝐵 for 𝐴, 𝐵 ∈ 𝑌 𝑛,𝑚
Note that in the above construction, we always fix an enumeration of the relative
atoms in𝑋𝑛,𝑚 in order to form the states in𝑌 𝑛,𝑚. This is important because it ensures
that numerically distinct states are always logically inconsistent.
We now have almost everything needed to build our canonical models. As a final bit
of preamble, we are going to fix a functionmapping each state𝑥 to amaximal consistent
set 𝑥∗ such that 𝑥 ∈ 𝑥∗. We then institute the following shorthand, where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are
also states.
𝑎 𝑥 𝑏 iff 𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 𝑎
𝑎 𝑥 𝑏 iff 𝑎 𝑥 𝑏 and 𝑎 ̸ 𝑥𝑏
When the 𝑥 is arbitrary or clear from context, we will drop the corresponding subscript,
and so just write 𝑎  𝑏 and 𝑎  𝑏.
Definition 8.5: For every type 𝑡, the corresponding canonical model ℳ𝑡 is con-
structed as follows:
𝑊 = {𝑥 ∣ 𝑥 is a state of type 𝑡}
𝑁𝑥 = {𝑦 ∣ 𝑦 𝑥 𝑧 for some 𝑧}
𝑎 ⪯𝑥 𝑏 iff 𝑎 𝑥 𝑏
𝑉 (𝑝) = {𝑥 ∈ 𝑊 ∣ 𝑝 ∈ 𝑥∗}
Proposition 8.6 (Deduction Theorem): 𝐴 ⊢ 𝐵 iff ⊢ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵.
Proof. The proof is the same as in the purely propositional case, and so left to the
reader. 
Lemma 8.7: The following schemas are all valid in any system extending B1:
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LT (𝐴 𝐵) ∧ (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 𝐶)
A1 𝐴 𝐵 when ⊢ 𝐴 ⊃ 𝐵
A2 (𝐴 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶 ∨ 𝐵)
A3 (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐵 ∧ ¬𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ¬𝐵)
A4 (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ¬𝐵) ∧ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐵 ∧ ¬𝐶)
when 𝐵 ⊢ ¬𝐶
A5 (𝐵 𝐶) ⊃ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶) when 𝐴 ⊢ 𝐶
A6 (𝐴 𝐶) ∧ (𝐵 𝐷) ⊃ (𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶 ∨ 𝐷)
Proof. To show A1, let 𝐴 ⊢ 𝐵. Then:
1. 𝐴 𝐴 ID
2. 𝐴 𝐵 1, WEA
To show A2:
1. 𝐴 𝐵
2. 𝐴 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 1, WEA
3. 𝐶 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 A1
4. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐶 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 2, 3, DI
To show LT:
1. 𝐴 𝐵
2. 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 𝐶
3. (𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∨ (𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) 𝐶 ∨ (𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) 2, A2
4. 𝐴 𝐶 ∨ (𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) 3, SUB
5. 𝐴 𝐵 ∧ (𝐶 ∨ (𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵)) 1,4, CO
6. 𝐴 𝐶 5, WEA
To show A4, let 𝐵 ⊢ ¬𝐶. Then:
1. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ¬𝐵
2. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐶
3. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 1, A2
4. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐶 ∨ 𝐵 ¬𝐶 ∨ 𝐵 2, A2
5. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐶 ∨ 𝐵 4, SUB
6. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐶 5, WEA
7. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 (¬𝐵 ∨ 𝐶) ∧ ¬𝐶 3, 6, CO
8. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 ∨ 𝐶 ¬𝐵 ∧ ¬𝐶 7, SUB
To show A5, let 𝐴 ⊢ 𝐶. Then:
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1. 𝐵 𝐶
2. 𝐴 𝐶 A1




3. 𝐴 𝐶 ∨ 𝐷 1, WEA
4. 𝐵 𝐶 ∨ 𝐷 2, WEA
5. 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 𝐶 ∨ 𝐷 3,4, DI

Proposition 8.8:  is pairwise connected.
Proof. We need to show that if 𝑎 𝑐 for some 𝑐 and 𝑏𝑑 for some 𝑑, then either 𝑎 𝑏
or 𝑏  𝑎.
1. (𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 ¬𝑎) ∧ (𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 ¬𝑏)
2. 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 ¬𝑎 ∧ ¬𝑏 1, CO
3. (𝑎 ¬𝑎 ∧ ¬𝑏) ∨ (𝑏 ¬𝑎 ∧ ¬𝑏) 2, DB
4. (𝑎 ¬𝑎) ∨ (𝑏 ¬𝑏) 3, CL, PL
5. 𝑐 ¬𝑎 A1
6. 𝑑 ¬𝑏 A1
7. (𝑎 ∨ 𝑐 ¬𝑎) ∨ (𝑏 ∨ 𝑑 ¬𝑏) 6, DI, PL
Pairwise connectedness follows by contraposition. 
Proposition 8.9:  is zigzag transitive.
Proof. We need to show that if 𝑎  𝑒 for some 𝑒 and 𝑏  𝑎 and 𝑐  𝑏 and 𝑑  𝑐, then
𝑑  𝑎.
1. 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 ¬𝑎
2. ¬(𝑏 ∨ 𝑐 ¬𝑐)
3. 𝑐 ∨ 𝑑 ¬𝑐
4. 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 ∨ 𝑐 ∨ 𝑑 ¬𝑎 ∨ ¬𝑐 1, 3 A6
5. 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 ∨ 𝑐 ∨ 𝑑 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 ∨ 𝑐 ∨ 𝑑 ID
6. (𝑎 ∨ 𝑑) ∨ (𝑏 ∨ 𝑐) 𝑏 ∨ 𝑑 4, 5, CO, SUB
7. (𝑎 ∨ 𝑑 𝑏 ∨ 𝑑) ∨ (𝑏 ∨ 𝑐 𝑏 ∨ 𝑑) 6, DB
8. (𝑎 ∨ 𝑑 ¬𝑎) ∨ (𝑏 ∨ 𝑐 ¬𝑐) 7, WEA
9. 𝑎 ∨ 𝑑 ¬𝑎 2, 8, PL

Proposition 8.10: Every sentence 𝐴 of type ⟨𝑛, 𝑚⟩ is logically equivalent to a sentence
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𝐵 of type ⟨𝑖, 𝑗⟩ whenever 𝑖 ≥ 𝑛 and 𝑗 ≥ 𝑗.
Proof. Given any 𝐴 of type ⟨𝑛, 𝑚⟩, we can find a logically equivalent 𝐵1 of type ⟨𝑛 +
1, 𝑚⟩ by using 𝐴 ∧ (𝐴 ∨ 𝑝𝑛+1), and a logically equivalent 𝐵2 of type ⟨𝑛, 𝑚 + 1⟩ by
using 𝐴 ∧ (𝐴 ∨ (𝐴 𝐴)). 





(𝑝𝑖∨𝑞𝑗  ¬𝑞𝑗), where the𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞𝑗 are the states of type 𝑡 such that𝑝𝑖 ⊢ 𝐴∧𝐵
and 𝑞𝑗 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵 respectively.
Proof. The proof is by induction. For the base case, suppose 𝐴 and 𝐵 are both of type
⟨𝑚, 0⟩ and consider the sentence 𝐴 𝐵. This is equivalent to
(𝐴 ∧ 𝐵) ∨ (𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) ¬(𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵) (12)
by substitution andweakening. Every sentence of type ⟨𝑚, 0⟩ is equivalent to a sentence
of type ⟨𝑚, 0⟩ in disjunctive normal form in which every conjunction is maximal with








where the 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞𝑗 are as described. The only thing left to show is that this is equivalent





(𝑝𝑖 ∨ 𝑞𝑗  ¬𝑞𝑗) (14)
The proof from (13) to (14) uses repeated applications of DB and A3. The other
direction uses disjunctive syllogism and repeated applications of A4 and A5. This gives
us the base case. The induction step is essentially the same, with the exception that we
use the induction hypothesis when showing that (12) is equivalent to (13). So the full
result follows. 
Observation 8.12: If 𝐴 is a state of type 𝑡 and 𝑥 is a state of type 𝑡, then 𝑥 ⊢ 𝐴 iff
𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝐴.
Lemma 8.13: Let 𝐴 and 𝐵 be sentences of type 𝑡. Then the following are equivalent:
𝑥 ⊢ 𝐴 𝐵 (15)
For every state 𝑎 ⊢ 𝐴 of type 𝑡 such that 𝑎  𝑔 for some state 𝑔 of type 𝑡, there
is a state 𝑏 ⊢ 𝐴 of type 𝑡 such that 𝑏  𝑎 and, for every state 𝑐 ⊢ 𝐴 of type 𝑡,
if 𝑐  𝑏, then 𝑐 ⊢ 𝐵.
(16)
Proof. Suppose (15). By Lemma 8.11 and the fact that 𝑥∗ is maximal, there is some
𝑑 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 such that 𝑑  𝑒 for all 𝑒 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ ¬𝐵. Now consider any 𝑎 of the type
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described. If 𝑑  𝑎, then 𝑑 is the needed 𝑏, so suppose otherwise. In that case, 𝑎  𝑑
(because is pairwise connected), and so 𝑎  𝑒 (because is transitive). But then 𝑎 is
itself is the requisite 𝑏 (since is reflexive), and so (16).
For the other direction, suppose (16) and consider any 𝑎 ⊢ 𝐴. What we are going
to show is that there is always a 𝑏 ⊢ 𝐴 such that 𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 𝐵. But in that case,
we can use DI to disjoin the antecedents of all such counterfactuals, with the result
being a disjunctive antecedent that is logically equivalent to 𝐴. So 𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝐴 𝐵 by
substitution, and therefore (15) by Observation 8.12.
Suppose then that 𝑎 ⊢ 𝐴 and that there is no 𝑑 such that 𝑎  𝑑. In that case, we
have 𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝑎 ∨ 𝑎  ¬𝑎 and so 𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝑎 ∨ 𝑎  𝐵 by (B8), and so 𝑎 itself can
be the requisite 𝑏. Now suppose instead that 𝑎 ⊢ 𝐴 and that there is some 𝑑 such
that 𝑎  𝑑. It thus follows that there is some 𝑏 as descried in (16) and, furthermore,
𝑏 ⊧ 𝐵 because is reflexive. There are then two cases. If 𝑎  𝑏, then 𝑎 ⊢ 𝐵, and so
𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝑎∨𝑏 𝐵 by ID andWEA.On the other hand, if 𝑎 ̸ 𝑏, then𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝑎∨𝑏 𝑏
and so 𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 𝐵. The upshot is that for any 𝑎 ⊧ 𝐴, there is a 𝑏 ⊢ 𝐴 such that
𝑥∗ ⊢ 𝑎 ∨ 𝑏 𝐵, as claimed. 
Lemma 8.14 (Truth Lemma): Let𝐴 be a sentence of type 𝑡 andℳ𝑡 the canonicalmodel
of that same type. Then for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝑊 𝑚,𝑛:
ℳ𝑡, 𝑥 ⊧ 𝐴 iff 𝑥 ⊢ 𝐴
Proof. The proposition holds for atomic sentences by construction and, whenever it
holds for a set of sentences, it also holds for the truth functional compounds of those
sentences. The proof thus reduces to the case in which 𝐴 has the form 𝐵 𝐶. That
it holds in this case follows from Proposition 8.10 and Lemma 8.13 by induction and
the construction of ℳ𝑡. 
Theorem 8.15 (Completeness): Given a consistent set of sentences of any of the systems
on the left, there is a finite pairwise connected model meeting the added conditions on the
right.
System Added Condition AKA
B1.1 zigzag transitive
B2 semitransitive semiorder
B3 fully transitive total partial order
B4 fully transitive, anti-symmetric total order
B5 fully transitive, symmetric universal relation
Proof. By the preceding. 
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